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A thinker sits alone in a room, reflecting on the deeply complex 
nature of the social world in perpetual motion just outside the 
door. After a long period of contemplation, the thinker concludes 
that most people cling desperately to what are in fact ‘always 
already’ fluid categories, borders, words, and names. The nation is 
an illusion; home does not exist until we leave it. The ‘other’ is a 
fiction, and so is everything else we create ourselves in opposition 
to. In fact, in the ultimate sense, if not conventional sense, even 
the ‘self’ is not what it appears to be. Finally, the truest of all 
possible truths begins to slowly crystallize. The thinker exhales 
deeply. 
 But wait—there’s a persistent knocking on the door—it is 
getting louder and more frenetic by the minute. The room does 
not belong to the thinker, instead it belongs to an institution, 
which expects, no, demands, that these very questions be 
examined, but there are so many other demands as well: the door 
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springs open, and in marches a long line of protocols, hierarchies 
and disciplines, all shadowed by various instantiations of pride 
and power. 
 The thinker is then called upon to fulfill endless obligations 
to the institution, whose own fluid, illusory nature remains 
somehow masked throughout. Often the contradictory demands 
of the institution proceed to ruthlessly reify many of the 
aforementioned abstractions, and our thoughtful soul is drawn 
into webs of competitive intrigues, self-aggrandizing projects, and 
ultimately fails to recognize the illusions within which s/he 
remains trapped.  
 But why? Why doesn’t our thinker use the theoretical tools 
she or he has applied so penetratingly on other things/places/ 
subjectivities to examine the home “institution” itself? Who is 
this un-reflexive expert of reflexivity? A university scholar 
trapped in the top room of an ivory tower? Or, perhaps, a 
Tibetan Buddhist monastic ensnared in the habitus of the vinaya 
(the Buddhist monastic code of discipline)? Or both?  
 The Buddhist monastic (monk or nun) and the university 
academic both ostensibly seek knowledge of the realities of 
society and subject, but through recourse to different 
institutionalized epistemologies, pedagogies and methodologies. 
Yet there are some striking similarities. In European history, 
there is a complex and intertwined relationship between Christian 
monastics and emergent intellectuals (Brint 1994, Le Goff 1963), 
while for most of Tibetan history, the monasteries were the 
primary institutions of higher learning and scholasticism.i 
Bourdieu asserts that the scholar has the benefit of “an 
institutionalized position of studious leisure” (1990:381), but the 
Tibetan monastic has a similar mandate to disengage from certain 
social conventions in order to reflect upon them. Consider one of 
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the prime methods of philosophic engagement towards truth-
seeking: meditation, or deep, often reflexive, analytical thinking.  
 At the risk of essentializing or over-simplifying two very 
different bodies of experts—‘Western’ university scholarsii and 
Tibetan Buddhist monasticsiii
 In general, despite the sharp analytical instruments 
available—the tradition of Tibetan analytical meditation, and the 
tradition of deep analytical thinking inherent in Western social 
theories and methods, for example—the institutions of the 
monastery and the university are themselves often spared the 
penetrating insight that their denizens turn onto other social 
institutions. If these are indeed failures, then what might they 
teach us about these two institutional cultures in particular, and 
about institutions in general? What would academics and 
monastics stand to gain from meditating, or thinking 
meditatively, towards deeper knowledge of the subcultures of 
their own esteemed institutions? What, indeed, would they stand 
to lose? 
—both of which exist in various 
forms in divergent regional, historical and sociocultural contexts, 
I argue that a side by side examination of the patterns of social 
norms of these two sets of meditative experts may be 
illuminating. Here I attempt a “provocative juxtaposition” (Boyer 
2005:289) of two intellectual communities of expertise—social 
scientists (especially anthropologists) at American universities and 
Tibetan Gelukpa monastics in exile—without eliding the 
substantive differences between them or trying to blithely stuff 
either set of experts into the other’s proverbial robes. 
 Or put otherwise: how is it possible that those fortunate 
enough to have mastered tools of reflexivity have not put them to 
sufficient use? It appears that institutionalization often runs 
counter to the work of both fabled ‘enlightenments,’ so that 
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scholars and monks are forced to reconcile deep institutional 
ambiguities about priorities and goals, and to ignore certain 
disjunctures between raison d’etre and modus operandi. The 
charismatic thinkers (such as the Buddha and JeTsongkhapa in 
the Gelukpa-verse) and prophets (such as the Boas, Levi-Strauss 
and Bourdieu of the anthropological theori-verse) of the past are 
haunting specters, but in their absence we flounder for 
institutional stability, and in the process some of the spirit may 
have drained out of the profound (see Weber 1968).  
 Denizens of institutions tend to demonstrate a real 
ambivalence to self-reflection upon the institution. When 
Gelukpa monastics do meditate or think analytically, it is not 
upon the monastery itself. Similarly, if anthropologists observe 
single-pointedly, concentrate, analyze or interpret, it is not upon 
the university or the discipline themselves. This is not to say that 
there is no self-reflection at all, but only that there is not much in 
the way of quantity or quality. In the academy, ‘front-stage’ 
reflections are still only ever side-shows: surface observations, 
such as dry statistical reporting on trends in professorial salaries 
since the turn of the century; the semi-marginalized side projects 
of junior scholars; or the nostalgic reflections of the retiree. 
‘Back-stage’ reflections are fleeting, private, whispered moments, 
which gives them the air of the illicit, the hurried, and the 
unwelcome.  
 Anthropologists hone countless practices of reflexivity and 
analysis that we apply to our countless field sites. Still, since we 
evince demonstrable ambivalence towards utilizing these 
technologies to look inward at our universities, our departments, 
ourselves, we generally fall far short of meditative thinking. 
Institutions are social constructions, of course, but if their 
denizens saw them as truly fluid and impermanent, then perhaps 
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certain crucial social illusions would be called into question. Is 
this not part of what we endeavor to do as anthropologists? 
Destabilizing the fictions and solidity of notions of national 
boundaries, racial and ethnic identity, etc., should hopefully lead 
our readers to think twice about the historical and sociocultural 
constructions of life, the universe and everything.  
 Since reflection and analysis lead to destabilized assumptions 
about how things came to be and the taken for grantedness of 
how things are, then perhaps anthropologists and Tibetan 
monastics have the greatest understanding of exactly how many 
fantasies of the ‘real’ we would stand to lose if we employed 
some of our meditative technologies upon ourselves. Why have 
we, as the constituent agents of these institutions, not challenged 
ourselves to look our fragility directly in the face? Perhaps we are 
afraid of what we might see, or even what may be conspicuously 
absent. Turning our own analytical technologies upon ourselves 
may ultimately lead to deeper understanding, or conversely it may 
lead to the loss of some very comfortable and cherished illusions, 
but either way, it seems that the cost–benefit analysis of such an 
endeavor is itself an exercise worth engaging in.  
 I hope to see actual meditative thinking upon ourselves 
recognized, taught, and supported within our periodicals, our 
ethnographies, our department meetings and also within the 
privacy of our own offices, homes and heads. I would encourage 
us to begin looking at the reflexive turn as more of a sustained 
and deep drilling towards what lies beneath, rather than as just a 
quick swivel of the head. The stakes are high, but still, how can 
we refuse a dose of our own medicine? Where are the self-
reflexive experts of the reflexive? If not anthropologists, then 
who? If not, Buddhist monastics, then who?  
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 As a lay practitioner of Tibetan Buddhism, and as a graduate 
student deep in the throes of professional socialization, I am 
interested less in the hypocrisy (or avoidance) of experts who fail 
to actually take the medicines they faithfully prescribe to (or force 
upon) others, and rather, more centrally interested in how more 
penetrating engagements with our own scholastic habitus—our 
practices, theories, ideologies, norms, conventions, assumptions, 
values, judgments, economies, kinship networks, exchange 
systems, power relations, etc.—could potentially help us to better 
understand and improve our practices instead of just blithely 
enacting and reproducing them. As an added bonus, if our 
theories are as good as we think they are, then individuals who 
engage in deep, sustained reflections using the meditative 
technologies at hand might just find a bit more clarity and peace 
of mind along the way. This essay can be read as a critique of 
both of my communities, and yet as my training in Buddhism and 
anthropology has also given me the tools and techniques with 
which I engage them as subjects, this essay can be read as a 
rigorous practice within those two tradition. Since both Gelukpa 
monastics and American anthropologists already engage in 
practices of deep reflection and analysis, then why not go the 
distance and begin thinking meditatively about the institutions we 
are a part of, especially the very ones that have shaped our 
particular brands of mediation in the first place?  
 
Meditations by Gelukpa Tibetan Monastics 
 
Despite being the envy of his fellows, one Tibetan Buddhist 
monk indicated to me that he harbored regret about his excellent 
posting in a foreign branch of his home monastery. It was a high 
status posting, but he had resigned himself to the fact that he 
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would probably never accomplish a Geshe degree. He noted that 
his busy schedule meant that he would not likely attain the 
meditative competence to achieve enlightenment in this lifetime. 
“I don’t meditate, but I wish I did,” he said sheepishly.  
 In his discussion of Buddhist monasticism, Gananath 
Obeyesekere writes that monastic sociality itself comprises one of 
the great paradoxes of Buddhism in practice, since the monastery 
that is ostensibly meant to separate the monk from society is 
both a society in and of itself, and still enmeshed and connected 
to lay society (albeit to greater or lesser extent in different 
historical and regional climes): “It therefore seems that the monk 
has escaped from one social structure only to get caught up in 
another…If renunciation aims to remove the fetters that bind 
one to worldly affairs, the monk has not succeeded” (2002:147). 
Obeyesekere goes on to say that if a monk truly wants to 
meditate, he must leave the monastery.iv
 The total institution is absolute in its demands of its inmates 
(Goffman 1961), and yet it is striking that even as a total 
institution, the Tibetan monastery and nunnery are not absolutely 
single-minded. One might think that as a ‘total institution,’ the 
monastic institution, to a greater degree than the (arguably un-
‘total’) university, should be a focused disciplining force towards 
meditative advancement, yet there are competing and sometimes 
contradictory demands made on monastics. Once, soon after 
converting to Buddhism, I rather naively believed that a Buddhist 
monastery or nunnery, institutions of ostensibly reflexive experts 
would be able to transcend the negative characteristics of so 
many other institutions—the inflated egos, over-attachment, 
bureaucracies, hierarchies, rigidity, and failure to see things as 
they truly are. However, during my dozen plus visits and stays in 
Tibetan monasteries and nunneries in both India and Tibet (for 
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days, weeks or months at a time between 2000 and 2007),v
 Tibetan Buddhism, by most accounts, emphasizes the value 
of mindfulness, contemplation, meditation, reflection and 
scholarly work towards seeing the ultimate, ‘empty’ nature of all 
conditioned phenomena. As a nascent lay Buddhist curious about 
the effects of a total submersion in Buddhist philosophy, I looked 
to the monastic institutions to see how the textual lessons on 
emptiness were negotiated in social practice. Just as I will later 
endeavor to understand for the world of American 
anthropologists: what does meditation look like in theory and 
practice? I will proceed by first examining the nature of 
meditation in Gelukpa Buddhism in theory, and whether it 
establishes itself as reflexive tool for examining itself or its 
environs. I will also explore the question of what is happening in 
practice—is meditation even a widespread practice in Gelukpa 
monasteries and nunneries, and if not, why not?  
 I 
encountered fragmentation, politics (intra and inter-social), 
nepotism, power plays, sexual harassment, strict patriarchal 
hierarchies, cliques, egos, desperate clinging to certain spurious 
notions of ‘tradition,’ resistance to change, etc. that I have 
observed in so many societies and institutions around the world, 
including so many American universities. Why the lack of 
mindfulness in a place that places such a high premium on 
mindfulness? 
 Tibetan Buddhist meditation techniques have been 
developed, taught and practiced in varying degrees for over a 
thousand years, and few Tibetan Buddhist scholars or scholars of 
Tibetan Buddhism would deny that within the literature it is a 
universally lauded and recommended practice (Dalai Lama 1995, 
Dreyfus 2003, Guenther 1992, Rao 1979, P. Rinpoche 1994, T. 
Rinpoche 2001). One meditates in order to gain a deeper 
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knowledge of the substantial illusions one invariably faces in 
society and in the mirror, because our illusions cause our 
suffering; meditation is then a technique for working towards 
enlightenment for the sake of oneself and all other sentient 
beings. Meditation is also known to bring mental clarity and 
peace of mind. In Tibetan, meditation (sgom) is literally 
‘habitualizing,’ or ‘familiarizing’ oneself with the object of 
meditation through rigorous mental concentration.  
  Tibetan Buddhist meditations can be concentration 
enhancement exercises, or elaborate Tantric deity visualizations, 
but sometimes they are ‘analytical meditations,’ in which worldly 
norms are deconstructed through logic: ‘meditation on 
impartiality,’ ‘meditation on love,’ ‘meditation on sympathetic 
joy,’ or classic meditations on ‘emptiness,’ or ‘impermanence.’ 
 However, meditation is not ubiquitous practice in Tibetan 
Gelukpa monastic contexts, and one finds that there is far more 
scholarly learning, debate, and reflection going on in monastic 
institutions than what is commonly thought of inside the 
tradition as actual meditation (sgom) practice. Gelukpa monks 
memorize and study reams of texts, and then, especially in the 
most prestigious teaching monasteries, they routinely debate each 
other either one on one or in larger groups. Most contemporary 
monastics rarely, if ever, meditate in the ways prescribed by the 
texts they study.  
 The three acumens (“prajnas”)—‘acumen arising from 
listening,’ ‘acumen arising from thinking,’ and ‘acumen arising 
from meditation,’ as described by Dreyfus in his seminal work, 
“The Sound of Two Hands Clapping” (1993)—show that 
meditation is just one level of reflection, which must be preceded 
by other important steps in learning and comprehension. The 
timing implicit in this triad is notable, since the third step of 
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actually practicing meditation is generally either deferred 
indefinitely, or at least until the monk has reached a very senior 
status. Many who attain the Geshe degree (loosely equivalent to a 
PhD in Tibetan Buddhist philosophy within the monastic 
institution) only begin meditation practice afterwards, in a year of 
study and retreat at a Tantric college. Often meditation is 
postponed until one can leave the monastery and go into retreat 
in meditation caves or huts elsewhere. There are some differences 
of opinion regarding the most important priorities and qualities 
of real monastic experts; meditation, it seems, is only one 
monastic technology, and it is a specialized technique that is 
generally only available at higher levels of study and deployed 
towards very narrow goals. 
 What are the institutional causes and effects of the deferral of 
meditation? Tibetan monks and nuns waiting to actually practice 
meditation until the ‘right time’ is perhaps not unlike 
undergraduate and graduate students waiting to use the 
theoretical techniques they’ve learned until they go to the field, or 
graduate students feeling that they should not publish anything 
until they’ve finished substantive doctoral research. There is a 
practical, strategic (Bourdieu 1977) sense that first one has to 
learn, and then what one has learned is best accomplished outside 
the institution that has taught one to how to do it. Gelukpa 
Tibetan scripture marks meditation, especially deity yoga 
meditations, as higher practice than other methods, and yet as 
such it is often considered out of reach of the typical Gelukpa 
monastic.  
 Meditation is often considered the purview of learned 
scholars, lamas and Geshes, and not a method suitable for lay 
people or the average monk. “Only lamas meditate,” is often the 
prevailing notion in monastic institutions. Tibetan monasteries in 
Jessica Marie Falcone 
 412 
the intellectual Gelukpa tradition have institutionally downplayed 
the significance of meditation in practice (though not in theory), 
by making memorization and debate the primary method of 
learning.vi
 The ‘listening’ and ‘thinking’ are done as preparatory work for 
years, while the ‘meditation’ is considered ‘the work of lamas.’ 
According to one informant, student monks at the “Institute for 
Buddhist Dialectics,” a Tibetan monastery in Dharamsala, 
considered meditation an advanced practice that was beyond 
them, so any attempt to meditate in public or set up a meditation 
session, was met with antagonism by other students who found 
the effort to be posturing, showing-off or such a premature 
performance that it would inevitably be a waste of time. 
 Monks at the primary seats of learning often enter the 
teaching monasteries at a young age and immediately begin 
systematic memorization of the most important treatises in the 
tradition (Sopa 1983), many of which actually foregrounding the 
significance of meditation as a method towards attaining 
enlightenment. Lectures, intense periods of independent reading, 
and frequent debates are the primary pedagogy through which 
Tibetan monastics, and for many student-monks practice. The 
other significant parts of monastic life include ritual, chanting, 
and prayers, as well as labor for the monastery. However, at the 
Institute for Buddhist Dialectics, the Namgyal monastery in 
Dharamsala, and the many other places I visited, there was never 
time on the schedule set aside for meditation practice.  
 When meditation does take place it is often accomplished 
elsewhere, at specific points in one’s educational path, and often 
away from the main monastery (in certain Tantric colleges, in 
retreat huts, or in caves). Although Obeyesekere was more 
familiar with Theravadan Buddhism(s) his comments on the 
impossibility of meditation in monasteries ring true to the 
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Tibetan Gelukpa experience as well; he goes on to write, “What 
then happens to the monk who wants to engage in the meditative 
effort that will hasten his salvation? The logical answer is simple 
enough: he must escape from his home in the monastery in a 
further flight into homelessness” (2002:148). There is a history of 
rare ascetic monks practicing in caves in Tibet, but more 
common was the intermediary step of meditative work in a 
Tantric college.  
 When Geshe Sopa, a highly respected senior Tibetan lama in 
exile in the United States, recounted his education (in pre-
occupation Tibet) in detailed interviews with students (1983), he 
did not mention any structured meditation practice until he 
entered the Tantra college (which he entered only after his Geshe 
degree had been conferred). He clarified that not all of the 
meditation students were Geshes, but that after attaining the 
Geshe degree, seeking further study in Tantric meditation is one 
of a handful of common options. When senior students or 
Geshes in the Gelukpa tradition do meditate, then often they are 
directed to focus on Tantric visualizations (or deity yoga). In 
Geshe Sopa’s case the emphasis at the Lower Tantra College was 
on meditations related to the Mandala rites of Guhyasamaja, 
Sambhara, and Yamantaka (1983:53).  
 Not all Tibetan monastics get the opportunity to live and 
meditate in a Tantric college, as they become more senior, or 
even as they work their way up certain hierarchies. There is 
significant divergence in the monastery about administration vs. 
scholarly pursuit vs. meditative discipline vs. ritual specialization, 
e.g. the Abbott vs. the Geshe vs. the forest dwelling ascetic vs. 
the discipline master. The ‘ideal’ Gelukpa monk would perform 
all tasks with equal competence, and some categories certainly 
overlap in practice, but often monks must specialize and choose 
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certain paths that foreclose others. There are competing 
hierarchies at work, and competing claims on the time of the 
monks and nuns.  
 Dreyfus wrote that Tibetan monastics in exile are cognizant 
of the multiplicity of qualities of the monks and nuns within any 
given the institution: “ ‘The great monastic seats are like the 
ocean.’ They contain all kinds of fish: scholars, students, 
meditators, monks involved in trade and politics, monks 
spending their lives comfortably without having to work, and 
even punk-monks (ldab ldob) — gangs who fight each other and 
play competitive sports” (2003:38). Dreyfus observed that from 
his experience and in the interviews that he conducted, it 
appeared that “not many” monks meditate in the Tibetan 
scholastic monasteries of contemporary Tibet and India (168). 
 Although the majority of significant Buddhist treatises in the 
Gelukpa Tibetan tradition emphasize the importance of 
meditation, the dearth of meditators in practice indicates that 
meditation is a method that can often be deferred for the time 
being, as other religious qualities are being developed. Since in 
Tibetan paramitayana cosmology enlightenment will almost 
certainly come after eons more lifetimes have come and gone 
(Collins 1998, Nattier 1991), there is no popular rush to meditate 
earnestly in the present, either for lay people or monastics.vii
 It occurs to me that I have never actually seen a Tibetan 
monk or nun doing meditation at their home institution in real 
life.
 
viii At a Gelupka monastery in Dharamsala, India that is 
dedicated to a state oracle, I witnessed courses taught, long hours 
in the debate courtyard, and long rituals, offerings and chanting, 
but denizens never admitted to having practiced meditation. 
From the guest house at a Gelukpa nunnery in Dharamsala, one 
can watch young nuns engage in vigorous debate out by the gates, 
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one can listen to hours and hours of chanting, and catch a 
glimpse of the classes offered, but if you ask the nuns about 
meditation you are met with tittering, shrugs, or blank faces. I 
asked one nun whom I had befriended while living at the 
monastery in 2000 if she or her fellow nuns ever meditated, and 
she laughed. My stay at the nunnery confirmed that if indeed 
there is meditation taking place, it is happening in private and in 
secret, since it is considered the purview of lamas, not regular 
nuns. My informants from the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics 
noted that while most monks did not meditate in public or in 
private, it was assumed that in the privacy of their own quarters 
senior faculty probably did analytical meditations on the 
impermanence of the self, as well as certain deity visualizations, 
but no one knew for sure. 
 One very occasionally sees Tibetan monastics meditating in 
the three-point posture at pilgrimage places, such as Bodh Gaya 
or Sarnath, but these cases are not nearly as common as seeing 
Tibetan monastics doing full prostrations in accordance with 
certain ‘preliminary practices’ or ngondro practices (to make merit 
and cleanse negative karmas). Monks and nuns (and lay people) 
doing circumambulations around holy sites, making offerings, or 
reciting mantras are a common sight at Buddhist pilgrimage 
places, but Tibetan monastics in meditation posture practicing 
what they’ve learned from their texts remains a rarity. However, 
not everyone approves of the notion that meditation is currently 
a high-level specialization or professional practice for only the 
most accomplished practitioners. In 2006, the Dalai Lama (whose 
daily routine is reputed to include meditation sessions), gave a 
talk in Bodh Gaya sitting under the Bodhi tree, in which he 
addressed the Tibetan sangha in the Tibetan language saying 
essentially that monastics and lay people do far too little 
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meditation practice for their own good, and that instead of doing 
divinations or prayers for their lay followers, high lamas should 
prescribe meditation practices for them to do themselves.  
 But still: even though meditation practice is not widespread, 
isn’t the scholastic work implicit in the other prajnas of the 
monastery encouraging critical, reflexive thinking? By and large, 
Tibetan Gelukpa monastics, through recourse to the ‘acumen 
rising from listening’ and the ‘acumen arising from thinking,’ are 
learning and discussing philosophies that reflect upon 
interdependence, emptiness, non-attachment, and other notions 
that destabilize easy social fantasies. Tibetans monastics may not 
be meditating en masse, but many are institutionally encouraged 
to reflect deeply on the world around them with Buddhist 
analytical techniques. For my Tibetan Gelukpa informants this 
was accomplished through the vantage point of social criticism 
embedded in the texts they studied and the vinaya (monastic 
codes) they keep, and also through their own version of 
Bourdieu’s “scholastic point of view” (1990) that allows them 
that certain distance from society which is institutionally 
supposed to encourage reflection and critique on the social 
norms of those outside the institution (e.g. the sins of desire, 
attachment, greed, etc. that are thought to be more common 
amongst householders). 
 However, in Gelukpa monastic contexts, reflexivity is only 
encouraged up to a point. “In the debate courtyard, some monks 
do talk about how the Buddha is empty of inherent existence,” 
said one informant from a monastery in India, but he went on to 
say that monks never debated whether the monastery itself is 
empty of inherent existence. The monastic institution seems to 
teach a version of reflexivity that fails to emphasize reflection on 
the monastic institution itself; no Tibetan Buddhist monastic has 
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been able to point me towards a textual source that expounds 
upon the necessity of recognizing the “emptiness” of the 
monastic institution, monastic discipline, or monastic 
hierarchies,ix
 Guru devotion and attachment to one’s monastery, however, 
are cultivated in both theory and practice. While emptiness is the 
true nature of all things in Geluk Buddhism, it is significant that 
the emptiness of the monastic institution then remains unspoken 
and implicit, compared with explicit efforts to undermine the 
solidity of self, material objects, romantic love, etc.  
 and no one has admitted to engaging in any 
practices of the sort.  
 Tibetan monastics are never explicitly encouraged to use their 
prajnas to destabilize the institution beneath their feet. Neither in 
text nor in practice are hierarchy, disciplining, and the micro-
cultures of the monasteries and nunneries considered appropriate 
objects for meditation or analysis. Occasionally, in the hallways of 
the monastic institution, there are whispered questions about the 
problem of attachment to the monastery; one informant from a 
Tibetan in exile monastery told me that he and his friends 
wondered aloud: “Is attachment to one’s monastery healthy, since 
it will bring one into contact with wisdom that will teach one how 
to develop true non-attachment, or is attachment to one’s 
monastery still just attachment to be overcome?” These 
conversations are significant, but they remain in the margins, in 
the private spaces and moments of monastic life, as if illicit and 
improper. 
 I have argued that insofar as many, if not most, Gelukpa 
monastics fail to ‘meditate’ in the strictest sense of their own 
terms, and even insofar as they still think critically about the 
world around them, they stop short of truly reflective, penetrating 
meditative thinking upon their own institutions. But what would 
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monastics gain from using their technologies, their prajnas, as 
techniques towards self-reflection on their institutions? If we are 
to take seriously the notion that “all conditioned phenomena are 
impermanent,” then perhaps monastics would do well to analyze 
and deconstruct their institutions (as they are wont to do to lay 
institutions) with their analytical and meditation techniques. Or 
conversely, perhaps Gelukpa Buddhists would decide upon 
reflection that an un-reflected upon monastic institution is crucial 
to the functioning of regular sangha, as any other minor illusion 
or untruth propagated in the name of ‘skilful means’ to lead the 
unenlightened closer to the truest truths, but it seems that these 
questions could be productively examined publicly, institutionally, 
and intentionally in order to judge how things stand and how 
they should stand.  
 As a convert to Tibetan Buddhism, I straddle the fuzzy line 
between insider and outsider, so this section has itself been a 
personal reflection on institutions that I have practiced in and 
have (with varying degrees of success) endeavored to put my faith 
in. So as a Buddhist practitioner now, and not an anthropologist 
entirely shackled to cultural relativism, it seems to me that even in 
their own terms there is a great deal of room left for self-
reflection upon the monastic tradition and on other Buddhist 
social mores; here I suggest only that the key may lay inside the 
tradition itself, because Gelukpa Tibetan Buddhism has its own 
razor sharp analytical techniques that might be turned upon itself 
in a sustained manner to useful effect. If this observation grates 
on the anthropologist trained to pounce on anything that feels 
the tiniest bit judgmental or prescriptive, well then go ahead and 
write cranky comments in the margins, but by all means please 
read on, because I am just getting warmed up. 
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Meditation and Reflexivity Amongst American 
Anthropologists  
 
What are the consequences of failing to think meditatively about 
ourselves? Put another way—why bother? I began the section on 
Tibetan monastics with a confession that my first brushes with 
the egos, hierarchies, misrecognitions and attachments therein 
left me deeply shaken in the strength of the Buddhist 
philosophies that these interlocutors also professed faith in: that 
is, if an institution devoted to and steeped in the reflexive 
technologies of Buddhist thought can be so dysfunctional in 
practice, then must my initial estimation of those vaunted 
technologies be necessarily re-evaluated, de-valued, or demoted? 
Will anyone reading this be surprised that I had a similar 
experience of partial-disillusionment when I began applying to 
graduate schools, and was quickly bruised by my first contacts 
with the egos, hierarchies, misrecognitions and attachments 
within some highly esteemed academic departments? Why are so 
many departments tangled up in such impenetrable webs of 
intrigue and dysfunction?  
 We speak in whispers, huddled and bent over cold beers: 
about how certain faculty try to reproduce themselves at the 
expense of our own visions and desires; about myopic committee 
members who panic if it looks like their student may go down a 
theoretical road other than their own; about sexual harassment 
behind closed doors; about being worked too hard for too little; 
about how the boundaries of gender, race and othering seem to 
show up the darndest places; about not being listened to; about 
confusion, about vocabulary, about bullshit; about the games, the 
rituals and the performances; about power and the lack thereof. 
Like flies buzzing around a barn teaming with overlapping, 
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competing, barely visible spider webs (yes, you remember, those 
webs of intrigue and dysfunction), we often don’t learn the rules 
until it is too late, many of us have been caught or lost along the 
way, and some of us can no longer even remember what it was 
that brought us inside to begin with. It could be much worse; it 
could be much better. The academy, like the Tibetan monastery, 
is no contemplative paradise.  
 Do scholars meditate on scholasticism? Scholars have gotten 
into the practice of writing down their analytical meditations, 
even sometimes titling their work as such. Among many others, 
consider Descartes’ famous “Meditations” (1948), Kierkegaard’s 
“Meditations” (1955), or more recently Bourdieu’s “Pascalian 
Meditations” (2000).x
 If scholars possess reflective analytical techniques, then, just 
as in the monastery, it is important to pay attention to who is 
actually using which techniques, who is teaching them, and who 
is learning them. Also, are any of these tools being used to the 
fullest extent possible — are we thinking meditatively? How 
critically do we examine our own academic culture(s) using any of 
our own theories? If we don’t, should we? If all that is solid melts 
into air, then how fragile are the walls of our own ivory tower(s)? 
Also, what is the place of reflection in the university, and what is 
the place of the university in our reflections?  
 While academics do not physically 
“meditate” as part of their epistemological process, arguably these 
scholars, like Gelukpa Tibetan Buddhists, do engage in analytical 
reflection upon their subjects. Many of our academic theories are 
analytics designed to help us dig deeper, and see more with more 
clarity. 
 Both academics and monastics have a whole host of analytical 
technologies to choose from, but we must all choose. Even a 
choice to not engage is a choice fraught with consequences. We 
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choose; we reflect on our choices within our work, but we do not 
reflect on our work through those very choices. As the Gelukpas 
Tibetan monastics at Namgyal monastery have countless 
reflective tools, such as stabilization meditations, analytical 
meditations of impermanence, and Tantric visualizations on 
anyone from Kalachakra to Chenrezig to draw upon if they so 
choose, we anthropologists can draw on our own toolkit(s) of 
analytical technologies as we see fit: practice theory, Marxism, 
deconstruction, structuralism, psychoanalysis, etc. Intellectual 
practice in the American academy requires quiet, contemplative 
reflection, and some tough choices, but not the full lotus 
position.  
 In my eight plus years in two different graduate programs, I 
have suffered some hard knocks at my own institutions, from 
granting agencies, from professional groups, etc., but I know 
from friends at other universities that the situation elsewhere can 
be, and often is, far worse. I have actually been reasonably 
content as a graduate student, fairly satisfied with my choice of 
profession, but like many of my peers, I am under no illusion that 
the culture of the academy is always, or even often, enlightened 
or enlightening.  
 My observations of academic departments in my graduate 
institutions (and others) have left me questioning the efficacy of 
our theories, and our very raison d’etre; if the process of 
demystifying, recognizing, and observing certain truer truths 
about the cultural practices of our informants still leaves so many 
anthropologists dysfunctional and alienated from ourselves and 
our colleagues, then does it not perhaps diminish the reputed 
value of anthropology’s reflexive technologies? What would 
deeper, sustained reflection upon ourselves using our own tools 
accomplish? If our theoretical tools, our mirrors and 
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microscopes, are useful and valuable as epistemological devices, 
then I suspect our academic culture(s) (and our egos) would 
undergo some transformations once we subjected ourselves to 
closer inspection. 
 Surface observations upon academic culture are a start, but 
we can do better, I think. Internal audits, master plans, and focus 
groups are all tightly controlled modes of self-inspection usually 
conducted by the university administration. While there is a 
literature on the various mechanisms of academic sociality that 
gesture feebly towards self-knowledge (E. Boyer et al. 1994, Clark 
1987, Finkelstein 1984, Lazarsfeld and Thielsens 1958, Lewis 
1975, Wilson 1979), few of these treatises extend beyond a 
statistical accounting of the minutiae of academic structures. 
There is better evidence of meditative thinking in contemporary 
anthropology; more penetrating academic meditations (Adams 
1976, Becher 1989, Bourdieu and Passeron 1977 and 1979, 
Bourdieu 2000, Boyer 2003 and 2005, Clifford and Marcus 1986, 
Siegel 1981, Strathern 2000, Taussig 2006) are far more elusive, 
yet far more useful as potential tools of disciplinary regeneration. 
However, even these penetrating moments are generally relegated 
to the margins, and considered side-tracks to the real business of 
being an anthropologist; they thus represent slight dips of the toe 
inside waters I would have us fully submerged in. Far from 
having us abandon our work with collaborators elsewhere, I 
would only suggest that we can continue apace elsewhere, and 
also begin to institutionally, integrally, intentionally work with and 
upon ourselves.  
 Using Falzon’s interpretation of Foucault as the consummate 
self-reflexive, whose ability to always step outside the system to 
rigorously and fearlessly look back in, Hall argues that Foucault 
can and should serve as a model to academics to reflect deeply on 
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themselves (2002). Citing Foucault, Giddens (1990), and others 
who have pointed towards the meta-reflexive, Hall rightly points 
out that with theoretical tools already firmly in hand, social 
scientists are uniquely situated to examine our own social norms. 
I agree with these perspectives, insofar as they demonstrate that 
scholars have the tools for meditative thinking at our fingertips. 
However, I do not think that Foucault’s tools are the only ones 
suited for the meta-reflexive. We ought to push ourselves to 
employ our many theoretical tools more whole-heartedly, and 
more systematically. I would like to argue that it is not our 
analytical tools that are necessarily flawed, but rather, it is our 
reticence in applying them to ourselves at the university, 
department and individual levels that has led us to remain poor 
practitioners of our own ideals. 
  Faure describes in great detail the ways in which 
philosophers and scholars of the Western academy almost 
obsessively and repetitively fall into the same philosophical traps 
of Western thinking (especially notions of Aristotelian logic like 
the rule of the excluded middle): “The idea that restricting 
philosophy to grammar, repeating the same structures over and 
over again in a quasi-obsessive manner, calls to mind the 
obsession with detail analyzed by Freud in connection with his 
remarks on ritual” (Faure 2004:47).  
 To what extent are the minutiae of scholarly pursuits just 
another set of rituals, another practice of a certain kind of magic? 
If indeed this is the case, then one would do best to dispose of 
the conceit that ours are unconditioned truths and that our 
incantations are somehow anything other that cultural 
constructions in and of themselves. While Faure does not 
advocate that scholars turn their backs on their academic lineages 
and rituals, he would have us recognize that ours are no more or 
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less valid than those of Buddhism (or other traditions). His own 
embrace of Buddhist philosophy is therefore not meant to 
undercut the Western history of philosophy, but rather to 
complicate it, and to expose some barred doors and hidden 
passageways in our notions of logic and rationality that we have 
forgotten, ignored or repressed.  
 “But wait,” my interlocutors in anthropology have said in 
various ways and at various times, “we are experts in reflexivity.” 
In various ways and at various times, I have responded: “Are we? 
Are we, really?”  
 We are experts of reflecting on the social, but it is still only 
‘their’ sociality that interests us, not ‘ours.’ That is to say, ‘they’ 
are no longer only indigenous peoples, the deeper we find them 
in the jungle the better; today, ‘they’ are also immigrants, 
investment bankers, chocolate makers, and UN staffers. Yet our 
subjects remain ‘they,’ and if they are ever ‘we,’ then that means 
that we too are sometimes immigrants and chocolatiers. Rarely, if 
ever are ‘we’ the subjects, meaning we the anthropologists, we the 
scholars.  
 It is possible to reflect upon ourselves even as we ponder 
them, as Michael Taussig has demonstrated through his use of his 
concept of the “nervous system,” which meditatively elucidates 
the place of the writer and his discipline within the narrative and 
through the narrative (2006). Dominic Boyer has also recently 
demonstrated in his book Spirit and System (2005) that our 
knowledge making practices can be examined alongside theirs. As 
Boyer contrasts the theories of systems theorists with the 
epistemologies evinced within a drinking group (stammtisch) of 
journalists in East Berlin, Boyer notes that the system theorists 
necessarily posit themselves as outside the system looking in 
from without. These theorists position themselves thusly in order 
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to theorize themselves as the retainers of ‘geist’ or ‘spirit’ in the 
face of the ‘system.’ One is compelled to reflect upon the 
consequences of reflexivity without self-reflection as Boyer writes 
that “the phenomenology of expertise casts the context of 
intellectual reflection into a state of triviality even when, as in the 
case of social theory, social context becomes an explicit and 
expert matter of attention. This explains how a social theorist can 
produce fully brilliant knowledge of social conditions and 
relations at the same time that s/he is always prone to ignore his 
or her own immediate conditions and relations of knowledge-
making” (Boyer 2005:299). While I heartily agree with Boyer’s 
insights and methods, I find myself more optimistic about our 
opportunities for transcending this state of things. At the very 
least we could at least try to more mindfully acknowledge and 
transform the conditions of our knowledge-making and 
reflexivity. 
 Over the past twenty or thirty years (depending on who you 
ask), in anthropology especially, scholars have evinced new 
dedication to the notion of reflexivity. Since our own cultural 
mores play a role in both the research process and the eventual 
framing of the ethnographic text, scholars now challenge each 
other to be cognizant and honest regarding the impossibility of 
the precise objectivity aspired to once upon a time. The reflexive 
turn that was ushered in by Jay Ruby (1982), Clifford and Marcus 
(1986), and others, was indubitably a turn in the right direction, 
but it is just that, a turn towards a path that we have yet to walk 
down. Reflexivity only asks us to be cognizant of ‘our’ (scholars’) 
fraught relationship with ‘them’ (our subjects). The reflexive turn 
is a methodological technology that encourages us to look deeply 
at the complexity of our discipline’s methods and products, but it 
stops there. We have stopped cold—dead in our tracks—as afraid 
Jessica Marie Falcone 
 426 
to face ourselves in the mirror as the garden variety 
eisoptrophobic. Perhaps Kluckhohn’s desire that anthropology’s 
insights about others could teach us something important about 
ourselves (1949) should be revisited, reappraised, restructured 
and revived in a new form, so that anthropology could provide 
clearer mirror(s) for (hu)man(ity). I would like to walk further 
down the path; why not be reflexive about our own scholastic 
communities, our discipline’s micro-cultures, our department 
politics, and perhaps even ourselves and our own desires in 
relation to the academy (stability? success? fame?). Why not be 
reflexive all the way down?  
 Undergraduate and graduate students toil away at the 
business of learning anthropology’s theoretical history, and write 
essays for class in preparation for more sustained applications of 
our theories later. We spar in conferences and seminars, and 
some of us even tentatively publish a review or article here and 
there, but few students would have the audacity to try to publish 
a book (just as few monks at the Institute of Buddhist Dialectics 
would have the gumption to practice the meditations they have 
been memorizing and debating). Graduate students returning 
from the field have passed through a crucial rite of passage, and 
our options expand before us. The post-field graduate student is 
permitted to write at length about ‘them,’ whether the ‘them’ is a 
tribe of Hopis or a corporate staff in Tokyo, but only ‘them.’ 
Conventions in our discipline rarely, if ever, encourage 
anthropologists to write about ‘us.’ Faculty might dismiss such 
analyses as navel-gazing, grade such efforts with skepticism and 
disdain; colleagues might warn that we may be pushing ourselves 
so far off the page as to think ourselves out of future grants or 
jobs (gulp!). My subject position as an ABD graduate student 
makes this an interesting moment for observation. I have both 
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everything (my future?) and nothing (my future?!) to lose in 
engaging in this line of thinking.  
 Recently, Steven Sangren noted in his article, “Anthropology 
of Anthropology? Further reflections on reflexivity” (2007), that 
it is precisely the etiquette and conventions of our discipline that 
make an anthropology of anthropology intractable practice, and 
insists upon caution over further public exploration (‘back-stage’ 
reflexivity being a supportable alternative), even as he himself is 
in the midst of a ‘front-stage’ reflection on the discipline. While I 
agree that our current disciplinary conventions resist reflection 
upon themselves, I would argue that it is in bad faith to explode 
‘their’ social illusions and continue on as if ‘our’ illusions are 
made of stronger stuff. If it is in bad form to write an 
ethnography of ‘us,’ it is also true that it is considered good form 
to push conventions towards truer truths, therefore on this point 
our own cultural logics stand in tension. Furthermore, 
conventions and etiquettes are always already fluid, so while one 
ought to be sensitive of where we stand at present, that 
knowledge should never foreclose movement towards another 
horizon.  
 It is possible that upon further reflection upon further 
reflection some scholars would feel that the anthropology of 
anthropology is as untenable and problematic as Sangren would 
have us believe. If the Buddha and Freud (and oh so many 
others) were right, then as humans we are all quite attached to 
our attachments and illusions, and putting them under scrutiny 
might be exceedingly painful. At the very least, I believe the 
question is worth further exploration. Whatever others may 
decide for themselves, I fully intend to keep playing with the idea. 
The conversation itself is evidence of meditative thinking. 
Sangren may find that he has been guilty of it himself. 
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 But what could we learn by writing ethnographies of 
anthropological knowledge production practices? What about 
using our theories of the subject to confront some of our own 
desires to publish, to teach, to reproduce ourselves and our ideas? 
Why not deploy our own theories on society on our own 
departments, conferences, and academic micro-cultures? Why not 
use our kinship theories to penetrate our own intellectual 
lineages? Where is the ethnography of the AAAs? What about 
using our theories of the subject to destabilize some of the 
bloated egos that sometimes haunt our disciplines? Would this be 
obscenely extreme omphaloskepsis? On the contrary, I believe 
that it could mean meditating our way deeper towards something 
healthier, more honest, and more complete. Can a discipline self-
actualize? I find myself wondering—what might meditative 
ethnography actually look like…?  
 I can envision a book, in which the analysis of ‘their’ 
(Sinhalese Buddhist? Thai boxers? American ‘news’ pundits?) 
ideologies, bodies, assumptions, and illusions are deconstructed 
side by side with ‘ours’ (anthropology’s? the author’s university? 
department? family? etc?). I currently fantasize about writing a 
dissertation in which each chapter is followed by a reflexive 
interval, in which I use the frames of my informants (from “the 
field” in India) and my preferred meditative technologies (from 
the field of anthropology) as mirrors to turn onto my academic 
micro-cultures and then upon myself. I imagine an institution not 
paralyzed with the fear of self-analysis, and departments plagued 
by less neurosis, less drama, less suffering.  
 I desire an experiment in the classroom of Myth and Ritual 
that would have students read our wide canon on theories of 
ritual, and then be invited to discuss the rituals of the university, 
and within the class itself, and to have them experience the power 
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of some of our theories as tools for meditation on the moment: 
an institutional invitation to ‘know thyself’ that really means it. 
And no, I am sorry, but including “the Body Ritual Among the 
Nacirema” (Miner 1975) on your Intro syllabus does not 
constitute final absolution.  
 I imagine a field of anthropology in which more, not less, is 
on the table for critique, analysis and reflection. I hope for a 
moment when the act of turning the tables helps us to recognize 
both the strengths and limitations of our theories past and 
present, so that with less attachment we continue to work 
towards the even better. I know that these moments happen, but 
I would urge us to push them forward out of the margins. I 
believe that thinking meditatively about our institutions in print, 
in class, in meetings, and in private would allow us greater 
confidence in our work, our discipline, in ourselves and in one 
another.  
 
“Deep Play” in Three Acts 
 
Why do we pack away our concentration and mindfulness along 
our notebooks, pens and tape-recorders when we return home 
from the field? I have gestured towards some potential benefits in 
engaging more frequently and more deeply with the analytical 
tools of one’s trade, but to be honest, I think that the 
technologies of one culture could possibly be productive for 
other cultures, and we could experiment and play with the idea 
that we all still have something to learn from one another.  
 In the quest for the truest truths possible, Tibetan Gelukpa 
monastics would arguably stand to gain from some of the 
methods and insights of ethnographic inquiry (I have a feeling 
Derrida would have been very popular at the Institute of 
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Buddhist Dialectics in Dharamsala), and we anthropologists may 
be able to learn something from our Tibetan comrades in 
reflective thinking. My prescription for a more hopeful 
anthropological future does not hinge on this sort of 
appropriation, but it never hurts to explore our alternatives to 
Weber, Levi-Strauss, Bourdieu, Foucault and the next big thing.  
 Just for fun, for kicks, perhaps we could try meditating on 
ourselves ‘Tibetan style,’ using a little of our substance and some 
version of their form, that is, a few of popular styles of 
meditation found in their textual traditions: stabilization, 
analytical and visualization. Playing with theories and 
technologies, ours, theirs, or both in tandem, may be another 
kind of ‘deep play’ (Geertz 1973) that is still quite a bit more 
serious than the ‘gratuitous games’ Bourdieu charges scholars 
with playing (1990: 381); here the stakes themselves are far less 
significant than the meaning created by risking them.  
 
Act 1  
 
A Tibetan text on meditation might advocate ‘watching the 
breath’ in order to both develop concentration, and to expose the 
wily underbelly of the mind, an organ that we mistakenly believe 
we have under control.  
 Now, try watching the university’s breath. You are at the 
university; in the office, or in the library, or in the hallway of your 
department. Take a moment; stop; sit; concentrate. Close your 
eyes, and breathe deeply—just for a few seconds. Once your 
mind is calm, you can begin. Stabilization meditations in 
Buddhism are meant to steady the mind with hard and fast 
concentration on the breath, on the moment, the ever fleeting 
‘now.’  
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 Open your eyes and observe single-pointedly. Watch the 
university swirl around you, and watch your mind swirl around 
the university. Do not judge, just observe quietly. Take it all in, 
but do not get swept away. If your mind wanders, don’t be 
alarmed, but gently bring it back to focused concentration on the 
university’s breath. 
 Did you notice anything new about the university? Your mind? What if 
we did this often, daily - how might it change our relationship to our academic 
habitus? 
  
Act 2  
 
The second type of Tibetan Buddhist meditation requires 
analytical concentration, so we anthropologists should be naturals 
at this. We do this all day every day, of course, but generally, as I 
have already argued, we analyze them, not us.  
 Choose a theory, any theory. Your favorite, perhaps. 
Hmmm… just for the sake of illustration, I will demonstrate 
what I mean. “All that is solid melts into air.” Consider this 
statement for a moment. What did Marx mean? Think through 
the analytic at length, and perhaps what role it played in Marx’s 
theoretical contributions writ large.  
 Now think about the university—the students, the faculty, 
the staff, the grounds. Fix that theory upon us, analyze what we 
are doing, what we do, and what we say we do. Meditate on this 
for a while—fixate, concentrate, analyze. Can you do it for twenty 
minutes, ten minutes? Try it. Come on, even five minutes. I dare 
you.  
 Does the theory you meditated on speak to your experience of the 
university in any way? If not, isn’t that just as significant as if it did? What 
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if we were committed to doing this sort of analysis on ourselves with any and 
all of our chosen theories? 
 
Act 3  
 
Gelukpas swear by guru or deity visualizations, so why not give it 
a whirl?  
 Close your eyes, and visualize your favorite theorist, 
________, (or the chair of your committee) sitting in front of 
you. Try to focus on the qualities of this person that you respect, 
and establish a motivation to develop these qualities in yourself. 
S/he responds by sending out these qualities in a stream of light 
from his/her forehead to yours. S/he turns into light and moves 
towards you, until your ‘guru’ is hovering above you, and facing 
the same way that you are. At this point, s/he dissolves in light at 
your crown; the light flows into you, and your own body glows 
with that light. Now you are ________. You have all of that 
person’s qualities, strengths and ideas, and you can channel their 
theoretical gifts in your own writing. 
 Visualizing yourself as an academostar may not rocket you towards the 
academo-stratosphere, but who knows, it may not be all that different from 
the standard motivational invocations to ‘see the ball go in the goal’ before 
taking the shot. I am curious whether meditative visualizations of our favorite 
theorists would further encourage a culture of guru devotion that already seems 
too prevalent in our institutions of higher learning. I’m returning back up to 
Act 2 to meditate on Weber’s notion of ‘charisma’ as it might elucidate 









Please do not misunderstand me — I am not suggesting that 
Tibetan Buddhist meditation techniques, Marx, or your (once and 
future) dissertation chair actually hold some sort of elusive key to 
life, the universe and everything. This interlude was not meant to 
be prescriptive, except in the sense that I would like us to shake 
things up a bit. Act up, play.  
 This interlude was meant to show that meditative thinking 
can be fluid, fun even, and that there are dusty corners that we 
have left unexamined. Mirrors only serve as mirrors if we look 
into them. Looking into a mirror can be a deeply troubling, but 
powerfully formulative experience, and it can also give us a new, 
fresh perspective on what we never knew we never knew.  
 This essay has in and of itself served as a meditation for me 
about the horizons and limits of the theories and practices of my 
two chosen traditions: the institutions of the Gelukpa Buddhism 
and American anthropology. I had to look deeply into these very 
mirrors myself while trying to examine the potential benefits of 
doing so, and while I did reflect upon some of my spiritual and 
academic norms and assumptions, I have perhaps only managed 
the tip of an iceberg. So, perhaps you are wondering about the 
effects I have experienced through this meditation that we are 
just now concluding together. Do I see myself, my religious 
beliefs, and/or my anthropological practices in sharper relief for 
having composed this essay in the first place? Do I actually feel 
so much better off for having taken meditative thinking seriously? 
What was lost along the way? Risked? Learned? Gained? These, I 
think, are very, very useful questions, and quite a fine way to 
begin. 
 




i. While conventional wisdom would have it that Tibet had only 
monasteries, and no universities pre-Chinese invasion in the 20th 
century, there was in fact a school (rtse slobgrwa) in the Dalai Lama’s 
residence, the Potala Palace, which trained the aristocracy towards 
professions in government.  
ii. In this paper, I will primarily refer to American anthropologists, 
but with the understanding that many of the patterns observed here are 
more widely (though not universally) relevant in university contexts. My 
point is not that there is no difference between departments, and 
disciplines within the US, but I maintain that there is enough similarity 
to make some general statements about academic patterns of social 
behavior. 
iii. Tibetan Buddhist clergy are in fact quite different across time, 
region, school, gender, etc., yet there are similarities enough to make 
some fair generalizations about the experience of Tibetan Buddhist 
monastics (monks and nuns) in contemporary Gelukpa institutions. 
Tibetan in exile monasteries are modeled on extant Tibetan 
monasteries which continue to function, albeit under different socio-
historical contexts. I will focus here on monastic Gelukpas in exile in 
India. 
iv. The paradox of Buddhist sociality within Buddhist monastic 
institutions are not entirely un-reflected upon in Buddhism writ large, 
as there are some who withdraw from the institutional duties of the 
monastery for meditation and deep study, like the Thai, Burmese or 
Ceylonese forest-dwellers (Mendelson 1975, Tambiah 1984) or the rare 
ascetic Tibetan monk (Lopez 2004:262). Obeyesekere notes that the 
forest dwellers are caught in a Catch-22 of sorts, since the more 
withdrawn and pious a forest dwelling community, the more lay people 
will gravitate to it, often forcing institutionalization: “there is no way 
that they can escape the relentless piety of devotees who seek them out 
in their forest fastnesses, invade their solitude and thus help to destroy 
the very saintliness that they so much admire” (2002:148).  
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v. My work with Tibetan Gelukpa monks and nuns on meditation 
was not a primary, funded field project, but was rather a secondary 
question that I pursued while doing three other research projects with 
these communities (and others) on engaged Buddhism, holy objects, 
and transnational Tibetan Buddhism. Despite the fact that my research 
on this particular topic was secondary, I pursued it through formal and 
informal interviews, and took fieldnotes throughout. My interest was 
personal as well as academic; I desired to understand to what extent 
meditation and reflection were being practiced by sangha in various 
monasteries and nunneries, so that I might better contextualize my own 
Buddhist values and practices. 
vi. Other sects, such as Nyingmas and Kagyus, may have more 
institutionalized opportunities for meditation. Kagyu monasteries often 
offer three year meditation retreats, sometimes inside the monastic 
compounds. Outside of the Geluk context, Tibetan monasteries 
emphasize two types of engagement: shedra (the exposition and study 
of texts), and drupdra (the practice of meditation retreat). 
vii. Certain Tantrayana philosophy does suggest that with diligence 
in Tantric practice one could achieve enlightenment in a single lifetime, 
but in practice Tibetan Gelukpa monastics see this as a path for the 
very exceptional few, like Milarepa.  
viii. This is, of course, excluding Tibetans who are running or 
teaching at transnational Tibetan Buddhist centers, such as the 
Foundation for the Preservation of the Mahayana Tradition. Western 
practitioners and their Tibetan gurus tend to foreground meditation 
much more than their counterparts in ethnically-Tibetan Buddhist 
institutions.  
ix. It is taken for granted that all conditioned phenomena are empty 
of inherent existence, but while one is encouraged to meditate on the 
emptiness of many things, people, places (and even the self), the fact 
that one is not encouraged to meditate on the institutions and trappings 
of Buddhism is a conspicuous omission. Exceptions exist, but most are 
not well-known, mainstream or in wide circulation in Geluk 
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monasteries. For example, Saraha, an Indian scholar overlooked by the 
Gelukpas, but popular in the Kagyu tradition, discusses how 
institutions, rituals, and so forth are empty of inherent existence. 
Arguably, although these moments of deep meditative thinking exist in 
a handful of texts, they are generally overlooked in monastic practice. It 
would be worth a longer exegesis on some of these textual exceptions, 
such as the social critique of monastics that could be imputed from the 
Virmalakirti Nirdesa Sutra (Thurman 2000) and other works, but that 
task is beyond the purview of this essay.  
x. These ‘Western’ meditations repute to probe deeply—more 
deeply than the common academic treatise—but do they really? While 
this remains an interesting category of work that deserves far more 
attention than I give it here, I am not inclined to privilege these self-
styled ‘meditations’ above the many other works that are products of 
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